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Abstract 
Evidence is growing that forms of incivility –e.g. aggressive and 
disrespectful behaviors, harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims– are 
spreading in the population of social networking sites’ (SNS) users. Online 
social networks such as Facebook allow users to regularly interact with 
known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely. This 
leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using 
the site, but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a 
mean field approach, we define an evolutionary game framework to analyse 
the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of interaction in online social 
networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents can choose 
to interact with others –politely or rudely– in SNS, or to opt out from online 
social networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the 
initial share of the population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility 
becomes generalized if its payoff increases more than that of incivility with 
the spreading of politeness in online interactions. Otherwise, the spreading 
of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead the 
economy to non-socially optimal stationary states. 
 
JEL Codes: C61, C73, D85, O33, Z13. 
Psyc INFO Codes: 2240, 2750.  
Keywords: online incivility; evolutionary dynamics; self-protective 
behavior; social networks; dynamics of social interaction; social networking 
sites; Internet. 
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Introduction 
There is growing evidence that “online incivility” is spreading across social networking sites 
(SNS) making them a potentially hostile environment for users ([1]–[3]). The definition of 
incivility has been long debated by communication scholars ([4]). In their study about 
televised incivility, [5] referred to it as the violation of well-established face-to-face social 
norms for the polite expression of opposing views. To the purpose of our study, we define 
online incivility as a manner of offensive interaction that can range from aggressive 
commenting in threads, incensed discussion and rude critiques, to outrageous claims, hate 
speech and harassment. 
The Pew Research Center (PRC) has documented the rising incidence of incivility in SNS-
based interactions: for example, 73% of online adults have seen someone being harassed in 
some way in SNS, and 40% have personally experienced it. 49% of SNS-using adults have 
seen other users behaving cruelly, 60% witnessed someone being called offensive names, and 
53% had seen efforts to purposefully embarrass someone. 92% of Internet users agreed that 
SNS-mediated interaction allows people to be more rude and aggressive, compared with their 
offline experiences ([2]). The Facebook “Pages” and the Twitter accounts of actors of public 
interest such as political parties, magazines, and celebrities provide a typical setting for online 
incivility ([3]). In these settings, SNS users can randomly interact with strangers who 
subscribed to the same feed. Even if subscribers may have specific interests in common, they 
are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of personal traits and modes of social interaction ([6]–
[8]). 
Interaction in SNS leads individuals to condition their behavior on the behavior of other users, 
in a strategic manner. For example, users may react to a hostile online environment where 
incivility is prevalent by in turn behaving rudely, or by abandoning the social network. 
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We study the evolution of online and offline social interaction in a mean field evolutionary 
game framework where individuals can choose whether to be polite or not when interacting 
with others in SNS. Everyone also has the option of opting out from SNS to cope with the 
possible hostility of the online environment.  
We model a homogeneous population, where individuals have the same access to 
technologies, but can pursue three different strategies of social interaction: 1) using SNS and 
behaving politely in online interactions; 2) using SNS and behaving in an uncivil way in 
online interactions; 3) opting out from SNS. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
departing SNS users reduce their social participation to the minimum amount of face-to-face 
interactions that are inevitably required in everyday life (e.g. the line at the supermarket and 
the interaction with the cashier). This strategy can be interpreted as a form of self-protective 
behavior, which emerges when the combined hostility of the virtual social environments that 
surround the individual prompts a drastic form of adaptation consisting in the withdrawal 
from any significant (offline or online) interaction with others. We define the equilibrium in 
which all individuals choose social isolation as a “social poverty trap” ([9]). 
The analysis of dynamics shows that the spreading of self-protective behaviors triggered by 
online incivility entails undesirable results to the extent to which it leads the economy to non-
socially optimal stationary states that are Pareto dominated by others. For individuals, self-
protective behaviors are rational in that they temporarily provide higher payoffs. However, 
their spreading causes a generalized decrease in the payoffs associated with each social 
participation strategy, which, in the long run, leads the economy to a non-optimal stationary 
state. The social poverty trap is always a locally attractive Nash equilibrium. When the other 
stationary states are attractive, they always give higher payoffs than the social poverty trap. 
Our contribution bridges three literatures. The first literature is that of economists and 
political scientists who empirically analyzed how Internet use may impact on aspects of social 
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capital such as face-to-face interactions and well-being (e.g. [10]–[13]). Our study contributes 
to this literature by introducing the problem of online incivility and providing the theoretical 
analysis of how the evolution of offline and online interactions can impact collective welfare.  
Our focus on social poverty traps is also related to previous economic and sociological studies 
that analyzed how economic growth and technological progress may cause a decline in face-
to-face social interactions ([14]–[15]), and to the literature concerning the “decline of 
community life thesis” ([16]). 
The second body of literature comprises physicists and economists studying evolutionary 
games on networks, both theoretically and experimentally. Several authors have analyzed the 
topological structure of interactions in networks in an evolutionary game framework (Starting 
from the seminal work of Nowak and May [17], a large literature grew. For a review see [18], 
[19] or [20]. For the specific contribution of economic thinking to this debate see, for 
example, [21]–[22]). We aim to add to this literature by building a mean field evolutionary 
framework to model the interactions that users regularly and randomly have with known and 
unknown others adopting different strategies of interaction in SNS. As we will explain in the 
methods section, the interaction with the various types of player mostly happens randomly, as 
it is hardly driven by homophily: while homophily in networks commonly concerns members’ 
socio-demographic characteristics, opinions and interests (see, for example, [23]–[24]), the 
strategies of online interaction we consider in this paper, in fact, focus on the personality traits 
determining whether an individual will behave politely or rudely on SNS– whatever her 
socio-demographic characteristics, opinions and interests are. We also relate to the literature 
about voluntary participation, or opting-out, which proved to be a mechanisms fostering 
cooperation in networks (see, for example, [25]–[26]). In our case, instead of a complete 
opting out from the game, we consider a partial opting out from the sole SNS relationships. 
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The third body of literature is that of psychologists and computer scientists who have 
analyzed the impact of SNS use on social capital and well-being (e.g. [27]–[29]). 
 
The decline in social engagement 
In his best seller Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam [14] documented that a decline in measures 
of social capital –such as participation in formal organisations, informal social connectedness, 
and interpersonal trust– began in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, with a sharp 
acceleration in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Putnam’s “decline of community life thesis” ([16]) prompted a number of subsequent 
empirical tests. [30] used a number of different sources to assess the development of social 
capital in the United States since 1952. The authors found a decline in indicators of 
volunteering, membership of organisations and entertainment with friends and relatives. 
Based on GSS data, [31] found a declining trend in indicators of social connectedness and 
confidence in institutions in the United States between 1975 and 2002. 
Apart from the United States, there seems to be a common pattern of declining trust, social 
engagement and organisational activity across industrialised democracies starting from the 
1980s, with the exception of Scandinavian countries ([32]). Declining trends of indicators of 
social interaction have been documented for England and Wales over the period 1972–99 
([33]), Great Britain over 1980–2000 ([34]), China ([35]) and Australia over 1960–90 ([36]). 
Putnam [14] discussed three main explanations for the decline in American social capital: 1) 
the reduction in the time available for social interaction –related to the need to work more, to 
the rise in labour flexibility and to the increase in commuting time in urban areas; 2) the rise 
in mobility of workers and students; and 3) technology and mass media. 
In the last decade, Putnam’s arguments have found support in a number of studies 
investigating the effect exerted on various dimensions of social connectedness by the rise in 
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working time ([37]), labour mobility ([38]), urban sprawl and commuting ([39]), and the 
impoverishment of the social environment, which can prompt individuals to pursue isolation 
([9]). 
[9] modelled the decline in social engagement as the result of a self-protective reaction to the 
reduction in the time available for social activities, the decline in social participation 
opportunities and the rise of materialistic values. According to the authors, the need to 
“defend” oneself from an unfriendly environment where social engagement becomes 
increasingly less rewarding prompts the substitution of relational goods with private goods in 
individual preferences, thereby favouring social isolation. Social isolation can be interpreted 
as a particular form of self-defense through which individuals make their utility independent 
from the actions of others. For example, individuals choosing social isolation tend to watch a 
movie alone through a home theatre system instead of going to the cinema with friends. They 
may even prefer to renounce their leisure activities to devote all of the available time to work. 
In this way, their payoffs do not vary with the closing of theatres or with the decline in the 
number (or even the unavailability) of friends with whom to share a night at the cinema. This 
shift in preferences is not driven by mutating tastes. Rather, as explained by Hirsch [40], it 
must be interpreted as a self-protective reaction to the deterioration of the social environment. 
Hirsch was the first to introduce the concept of defensive consumption choices in his seminal 
work on the social limits to growth. This kind of consumption occurs in response to a change 
in the physical or social environment: “If the environment deteriorates, for example, through 
dirtier air or more crowded roads, then a shift in resources to counter these “bads” does not 
represent a change in consumer tastes but a response, on the basis of existing tastes, to a 
reduction in net welfare” ([40], p. 63). 
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The rise in SNS-mediated interaction 
In Bowling Alone [14], Putnam argued that progress in information technology could further 
exacerbate the decline in community life. At the time, Putnam referred to the negative role of 
television and other forms of technology-based entertainment such as video players and 
videogames. Early Internet studies reprised Putnam’s arguments suggesting that the Internet 
might displace even more social activities than television ([41]). The displacement hypothesis 
was supported by the first empirical tests of the relationship between Internet use and face-to-
face interactions (e.g. [42]–[43]). 
These explorations, however, were carried out before the rise of SNS, when using the Internet 
was predominantly a solitary activity with limited relational implications. Today, Internet use 
is closely related to engagement in online social networks (hereafter we will use the terms 
social networking sites and online social network as synonims for the sake of brevity). 
According to the Pew Research Center (PRC) Internet & American Life Project Survey, as of 
September 2014, 71 per cent of online adults were active on Facebook, 23 per cent used 
Twitter, 28 per cent used Pinterest and 26 per cent used Instagram ([44]). 
These Figures mark a dramatic increase from 2009, when the PRC first began collecting data 
on Internet use. At that time, 46 per cent of online adults had ever used a SNS ([45]). Despite 
the extent of this transformation, the economic research on online networks is limited. In the 
fields of social psychology and communication science, several authors have tackled the 
potential role of SNS in face-to-face interaction in small samples of students in American 
colleges ([27]–[28], [46]). 
In economics, a few studies empirically assessed the role of broadband on aspects of social 
capital and political participation but, due to a lack of data, they could not tackle the possible 
role of online social networks. Based on German Socio-Economic Panel data, [13] found that 
having broadband Internet access at home has positive effects on individuals’ social 
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interactions, manifesting in a higher frequency of visiting theatres, opera and exhibitions, and 
in a higher frequency of visiting friends. Using data on Italian municipalities, [11] found that 
the diffusion of broadband led, initially, to a significant decline in electoral turnout in national 
parliamentary elections. This was reversed in the 2013 elections when the first round took 
place after the explosive rise of SNS. [10] found that the progressive increase in DSL 
availability significantly decreased voter turnout in German municipalities. 
[47] theoretically analysed the evolution of social participation and the accumulation of social 
capital in relation to technological progress and online networking. Their results suggest that, 
under certain conditions, the stock of information and social ties accumulated within online 
networks can create an infrastructure that helps individuals to develop their social 
participation despite space and time constraints. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that face-to-face and SNS-mediated interaction may be 
complementary, rather than one substituting the other. On the other hand, there is evidence 
that, despite the steep rise in the use of SNS, a decreasing yet still remarkable share of online 
adults chooses not to use or even to abandon them (see for example [48], for the U.S., and 
[49], for Italy). 
 
The problem of online incivility 
The rise of SNS-mediated interaction has been accompanied by the emergence of new, 
unexpected, downsides. Anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggests that interaction in online 
social networks has increasingly been plagued by online incivility ([1]–[2]). The roots of 
incivility in SNS-mediated social interactions have been addressed in a few psychological 
studies, which suggest that, when it comes to the presentation of opposing views and 
opinions, there is a fundamental difference between face-to-face and Internet-mediated 
interactions. 
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In contrast to online conversations, face-to-face interactions entail the use of expressions, 
smiles, eye contact, tone of voice, gesturing, and other nonverbal behavior that makes it easier 
to correctly perceive the interlocutors’ feelings and intentions. Online conversations, on the 
other hand, are more vulnerable to incomprehension and misunderstandings. In SNS-mediated 
interactions, interlocutors are basically “invisible” and their feelings and sensitivities can 
hardly be perceived. As stated by [50] in an early study on computer-mediated 
communication, “Communicators must imagine their audience, for at a terminal it almost 
seems as though the computer itself is the audience. Messages are depersonalized, inviting 
stronger or more uninhibited text and more assertiveness in return”. [50] observed that 
computer-mediated communication entails anonymity, reduced self-regulation, and reduced 
self-awareness. “The overall weakening of self or normative regulation might be similar to 
what happens when people become less self-aware and submerged in a group, that is, 
deindividuated” (p. 1126). Deindividuation has in turn been found to be conducive to 
disinhibition and lack of restraint ([51]). 
As a result, while in physical interactions people usually think twice before behaving 
offensively with a person who expresses an opposing view, SNS users are likely to care less 
about the risk of offending others in online conversations. In a pioneering experiment 
comparing face-to-face and online conversations, [52] found that people in computer-
mediated groups were more aggressive than they were in face-to-face groups. In general, they 
were more responsive to immediate textual cues, more impulsive and assertive, and less 
bound by precedents set by societal norms of how to behave in groups. Based on survey data 
collected in a big U.S. company, [53] found that computer-mediated communication has 
substantial deregulating effects and encourages disinhibition in respect to non-mediated 
interactions. 
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Further studies suggested that a more impulsive and assertive behavior that does not consider 
the recipients’ feelings is far more common in Internet-mediated discussions as compared to 
face-to-face encounters ([54]). This phenomenon has been conceptualized as “flaming” ([52]). 
It refers to the expression of strong and uninhibited opinions, consisting of extreme emotional 
behavior expressed through uninhibited speech (insulting, offending, hostile comments, etc.). 
The experimental studies mentioned above were conducted in very limited networks that were 
created ad hoc by researchers. It is reasonable to argue that in large networks such as 
Facebook and Twitter deindividuation and, therefore, disinhibition are likely to be 
exacerbated. Recent studies on Facebook have shown that controversial content was more 
frequent than any prosocial content categories, suggesting that there is an overrepresentation 
of negative content on the platform ([55]). A further distinctive element of interaction in big 
online networks is that possible reactions to provocative behaviours can be easily neutralized, 
for example by simply switching off the device, or even by “blocking” the interlocutor 
through the network’s privacy settings. These “exit options” probably further weaken 
inhibitions and self-regulation ([3]). By contrast, one cannot easily withdraw from an 
unpleasant face-to-face discussion. 
The problem of incivility is important because the infringement of social norms for the polite 
expression of opposing views can provoke emotional and behavioral responses with relevant 
economic and political consequences. [5] experimentally analyzed the impact of incivility in 
mediated communication on trust. The authors noted a fundamental difference between face-
to-face and television-mediated discussions about political views. Television-mediated 
presentations of opposing opinions often violate face-to-face social norms and easily deviate 
from civility. [5] collected experimental evidence that witnessing televised incivility causes a 
loss of trust in others. The authors claimed that, when social norms of politeness are violated 
in televised debates, watchers might feel hurt as if they personally experienced the offences 
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they saw on TV. Sabatini and Sarracino [56] argued that when incivility takes place in SNS-
mediated interactions, users’ feelings might be affected as if the offences where perpetrated in 
real life. In respect to what may happen with televised incivility, witnessing online incivility 
entails a more intense emotional involvement not only because one can be personally targeted 
with offensive behaviors but also because when others are being offended in online 
environments there is a concrete possibility to intervene in their defense. Based on Italian 
survey data, [56] found that SNS users have significantly lower levels of trust in strangers, in 
neighbors, and in institutions than non-users and that such a decline in trust may be 
detrimental for users’ well-being. The use of SNS could cause a decline in trust through 
different mechanisms, some of which have already been mentioned: for instance, increased 
awareness of diversity, experience of new social norms and more frequent exposure to 
incivility as compared to face-to-face interactions. Overall, the evidence regarding online 
incivility suggests that SNS can easily become a hostile environment for users and prompts 
the need to analyze two different strategies of social interaction via SNS, based on the 
propensity for acting civilly or not. 
 
Model and Methods 
We assume that agents can choose between two different ways of social involvement: 1) 
Active social involvement, entailing the development of interpersonal relationship both by 
means of face-to-face and SNS-mediated interactions. 2) Limited social involvement, 
entailing the opting out from SNS and the maintenance of the minimum amount of face-to-
face interactions that are required for the completion of everyday life task, such as, for 
example, the interaction with the cashier at the supermarket and limited on-the-job 
interactions. 
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In addition, socially active agents who do not opt out from online social networks can also 
choose to behave either politely or rudely in SNS-mediated interactions. 
In detail the strategies resulting from these possible choices are as follows: 
1. Strategy H: social relations are developed both by means of face-to-face interactions 
and via social networking sites. SNS users who choose H (for Hate) behave online in 
an uncivil way. For example, these agents indulge in offensive and disrespectful 
behaviors, incensed discussions and rude critiques, outrageous claims and hate speech. 
2. Strategy P: agents who follow this strategy develop their social relations both by 
means of face-to-face interactions and via SNS. In contrast to H players, however, P 
players behave politely in online interactions. We call this strategy P (for Polite). 
3. Strategy N: agents following this strategy choose to withdraw from SNS-mediated 
relations and reduce face-to-face relations to the minimum. We label this strategy as N 
(for No SNS participation) and we call the equilibrium in which all individuals play N 
a “social poverty trap” ([9]). The withdrawal from SNS interactions modeled with the 
N strategy may be viewed as a drastic form of adaptation to the hostility of the 
environment that make N players’ payoff constant and completely independent from 
the behavior of others.  
We first notice that the N strategy is a sort of opting out strategy. As discussed in the 
introduction, these kinds of strategy have been proved useful to foster cooperation in social 
dilemmas. However, contrary to standard opt out strategies, here agents playing N remain in 
the game but choose a “lower” level of interaction. When a P or a H agent switches to the N 
strategy, she breaks SNS connections with other people, while when an agent switches from N 
to P or H strategy, she creates SNS connections. 
 14 
In each instant of time t, individuals interact with many others. The interactions between H 
and P individuals take place both face to face and via SNS. Those in which N agents are 
involved are reduced to the minimum face-to-face encounters needed. 
 
Payoffs 
Let us indicate by 𝑥! 𝑡 , 𝑥!(𝑡), and 𝑥!(𝑡) the shares of individuals adopting strategies H, P, 
and N, respectively, at time t. It holds 𝑥!(𝑡) ≥ 0, all i, and   𝑥!! (𝑡) = 1, therefore the vector 𝑥(𝑡) ≡ (𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡)) belongs to the three-dimensional simplex S represented in Figure 
1. 
We assume that each agent interacts with agents of different types contemporarily. We call 𝑥!(𝑡) ≡ (𝑥!!(𝑡), 𝑥!!(𝑡), 𝑥!!(𝑡)) the vector of shares of the different strategies played by the 
sub-population of agents with whom the individual j is matched at each instant of time t. Then 
we assume that the payoff   Π!! that each agent j gets from playing strategy i depends on 𝑥!(𝑡), 
Π!! 𝑥!(𝑡) . 
Following standard mean field analysis, we assume that the types of agents an individual can 
meet in her social interactions reflects the average composition of the population. Thus, at 
each time t, each agent has neighbors of different types according to shares 𝑥! 𝑡 , 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡). This is a standard assumption in the economic analysis of complex networks (see, for 
example Vega-Redondo, [57]–[58]), which allows us to better focus on how changes in 
average population shares affect the payoff and the adoption dynamics of strategies. More 
specifically, we are interested in analyzing the adoption of the opting out strategy N, rather 
than in the effects that the specific composition of neighborhoods have. While the specific 
topological structure of the interactions plays a decisive role in shaping some features of the 
dynamics (see [18]–[20]), this simplification allows us to obtain a complete classification of 
the dynamics and to determine the average effects of the different population shares on the 
stationary state. Moreover, in our framework the mean field assumption is justified by the fact 
that we do not model interactions in friendship networks, where homophily plays a crucial 
role, but we model many random face-to-face daily interactions and interactions in SNS. 
These last ones involve friends, friends of friends and a large amount of agents with whom 
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any SNS user randomly interacts. This randomness is particularly evident when it comes to 
the interactions that SNS users have with strangers on the Facebook Pages and Twitter 
accounts of actors of public interest. When a stranger writes a comment in a thread (e.g. a 
news or an op-ed) opened in such pages, her comment pops up in the newsfeed of all the 
page’s followers. This mechanism provides the chance to randomly interact with a large 
amount of unknown people. For example, major newspapers usually have millions of 
followers. Such followers might have specific interests and opinions in common, which can 
lead them to form networks driven by forms of homophily. However, they are likely to be 
heterogeneous in terms of the dimensions we are interested in modeling through the P and the 
H strategies, that is their propensity for behaving politely or rudely in online interactions. 
As a last point, even if we assume homophily to play a role, this is very likely to happen along 
the dimensions of gender, ethnicity, tastes, and not along the dimensions described by our 
strategies which depend on deeper personality traits that are likely to be orthogonal to the 
drivers of homophily. 
Consequently Π!! 𝑥!(𝑡) = Π! 𝑥(𝑡) , that is the payoff of playing a given strategy is 
independent of the specific identity of the player and just depends on the population shares 
and on the strategy played. 
The strategic context of the game is illustrated by the following payoff matrix representing the 
payoffs of row-players when meeting an homogenous set of agents playing column strategy. 
 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝐻 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝑃 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝑁𝐻 𝛽 𝛾 0𝑃 −𝛿 𝜀 0𝑁 𝜂 𝜂 𝜂  
 
When a row player meets a heterogeneous set of agents, then her payoffs are derived by the 
convex linear combination of payoffs whose weights are the population shares. Consider first 
H and P strategies: 
    Π! 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 𝛽𝑥! + 𝛾𝑥! 
    Π! 𝑥!, 𝑥! = −𝛿𝑥! + 𝜀𝑥! 
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Notice that, with this specification, the payoffs do not depend on the number of interactions 
each agent has (and thus on the degree of each agent in the network), but on the shares of 
strategies in own neighborhood. 
The payoff of the N strategy is assumed to be constant and, therefore, it does not depend on 
the distribution (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) of strategies: Π! = 𝜂 
We assume 𝛿, 𝜀, 𝜂 > 0. The strict positivity of 𝜂 characterizes N as a self-protective strategy: 
in a context where no one engages in social interactions, N becomes the best performing 
strategy. We also assume that the payoff from virtuous social interactions (i.e. adopting 
strategy P) is increasing in the proportion of people interacting in such a way (𝜀 is positive). 
Finally, we assume the impact of the diffusion of the “hate” strategy on a polite’s payoff is 
always negative (𝛿 is positive). 
We instead allow the parameters 𝛽 and  𝛾 to be either positive or negative. It is not clear, in 
fact, whether haters get more satisfaction when dealing with polite SNS users or by 
confronting with others of the same type. A H player, for example, may find the interaction 
with a polite player who defuses provocations with kindness less rewarding; accordingly, we 
allow H players to even get disutility from the interaction with a polite person. Or, by 
contrast, she may find it harder, and less rewarding, to confront another hater. 
Notice that: 
1) The population state  𝑁 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 0,0,1       –where all individuals play the N 
strategy– is always a (strict) Nash equilibrium. 
2) The population state 𝐻 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 1,0,0    –where all individuals play the H 
strategy– is a Nash equilibrium if and only if   𝛽 > 𝜂. 
 17 
3) The population state  𝑃 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 0,1,0    –where all individuals play the P 
strategy– is a Nash equilibrium if and only if    𝜀 > 𝛾, 𝜂. 
4) The pure population states 𝑁, 𝐻, and 𝑃 can simultaneously be Nash equilibria. 
5) The payoff of each individual in the state 𝑁 (given by 𝜂) is lower than the payoff of 
each individual in the states 𝐻, and 𝑃 (given, respectively, by 𝛽, and  𝜀) when such 
states are Nash equilibria. 
6) The N strategy is never dominated by the other strategies. The H strategy is dominated 
by N if  𝜂 ≥ max  (𝛽, 𝛾), while it is dominated by P if  𝛽 ≤ −𝛿 and  𝛾 ≤ 𝜀. Finally, the 
P strategy is dominated by N if  𝜀 ≤ 𝜂, while it is dominated by H if  𝛽 ≥ −𝛿 and 𝛾 ≥𝜀. 
According to a well-known result in evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., [59]), if the pure 
population states   𝑁, 𝐻, and 𝑃  are Nash equilibria, then they also are (locally) attractive 
stationary states under every payoff-monotonic adoption dynamics of strategies. 
Consequently, in the contexts in which 𝑁 is not the unique existing Nash equilibrium, the 
adoption dynamics are path dependent in that different stationary states may be reached 
starting from different initial distributions 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥! 0   of strategies.  
The stationary state 𝑁 can be interpreted as a social poverty trap, in the sense of [9]; that is, as 
an attractive stationary state where aggregate social participation and welfare (measured by 
payoffs) fall to the lowest possible level with respect to other stationary states. 
To focus our analysis on more relevant cases only, we shall study adoption dynamics under 
the assumption that no strategy is dominated by others (see Point 6 above). Such assumption 
requires the following restrictions on parameters’ values: 𝜀 > 𝜂,  max  (𝛽, 𝛾) > 𝜂     (1) 
either  𝛽 > −𝛿 and 𝛾 < 𝜀 or   𝛽 < −𝛿 and  𝛾 > 𝜀   (2) 
Notice that: 
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a) In the context in which  𝛽 > −𝛿 and 𝛾 < 𝜀  hold (see (2)), also the state 𝑃 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! =0,1,0    –where all individuals play the P strategy– is a Nash equilibrium (and, therefore, a 
locally attractive stationary state), while the state  𝐻 = 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 1,0,0   – where all 
individuals play the H strategy– may be a Nash equilibrium (this is the case only if 𝛽 > 𝜂) or 
not. 
b) In the context in which 𝛽 < −𝛿 and 𝛾 > 𝜀  hold (see (2)), the states 𝑃  and 𝐻 are never Nash 
equilibria (and, therefore, they are never attractive). As we will see, such a context favours the 
coexistence of the H and the P strategy. Importantly, this context captures an interesting set of 
social scenarios: the first condition,  𝛽 < −𝛿, requires that a H player is more negatively 
affected by interacting with H players than what would happen to a P player, suggesting that 
(i) haters do not get along with each other, possibly because they get no satisfaction in the 
absence of a proper “victim” and/or are forced to take a taste of their own medicine, whereas 
(ii) polite people are only mildly annoyed by interacting with haters. On the other hand, the 
second condition,  𝛾 > 𝜀, implies that interacting with P players is more satisfactory for a H 
player than for another P player. 
 
Evolutionary dynamics 
Following [60], we assume that the diffusion of the three strategies is described by the 
replicator equations: 
 𝑥! = 𝑥! Π! 𝑥!, 𝑥! − Π 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!      𝑥! = 𝑥! Π! 𝑥!, 𝑥! − Π 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!    (3)   𝑥! = 𝑥! Π! − Π 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!    
 
Where 𝑥!, 𝑥!, and 𝑥! represent the time derivatives of the functions 𝑥!(𝑡), 𝑥!(𝑡), and 𝑥!(𝑡), 
respectively, and: 
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Π = 𝑥!Π! + 𝑥!Π! + 𝑥!Π! 
 
is the population-wide average payoff of strategies. 
Dynamics (3) are defined in the simplex S illustrated in Figure 1, where 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! ≥ 0 and 𝑥! + 𝑥! + 𝑥! = 1 hold. 
According to replicator equations (3), individuals tend to imitate players who adopt the 
relatively more rewarding strategies. As a consequence, such strategies spread in the 
population at the expenses of the less rewarding ones. 
All the pure population states 𝑁, 𝐻, and 𝑃 are stationary states under dynamics (3). 
Furthermore, the edges of S where one strategy is adopted by no one are invariant under 
dynamics (3); that is, every trajectory starting from a point belonging to one of the edges, 
remains in the edge for every time . Replicator dynamics, and any other payoff-
monotonic dynamics, represent selection, as opposed to mutation, in the sense that they 
represent the selection process of present behaviors (pure strategies) via imitation of the more 
rewarding ones, while absent behaviors remain absent ([59], p. 140). When a new strategy 
enters the “market”, it can be adopted (imitated) by agents only if, at the initial time t=0, a 
strictly positive share of agents decide to adopt it. Initial strategy choices 𝑥!(0), 𝑥!(0), and 𝑥!(0) are considered as exogenously determined and may be influenced by several factors. 
 
),( +∞−∞∈t
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Figure 1: The two-dimensional simplex S in the space (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!). The points (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) = (1,0,0), (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) = (0,1,0), and (𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) = 0,0,1   correspond, respectively, to the vertices 𝐻, 𝑃 and 𝑁, where all 
individuals play, respectively, strategies H, P, and N. Along the edge joining 𝐻 and 𝑃 (respectively, 𝐻 and 𝑁, 𝑃 
and 𝑁) the strategy N (respectively, P, H) is not played.  
 
 
Results 
Classification of dynamic regimes 
The analysis of system (3) builds on the classification results in Bomze [61]. It allows us to 
give a complete classification of all the possible dynamic regimes that may be observed under 
system (3). The computations allowing us to apply Bomze’s classification to our model are 
very simple and we omit them (see [47], for an example of application of Bomze’s 
classification method). 
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The dynamic regimes that can be observed are illustrated in Figures 2a-2f. In these figures, a 
full dot  represents a locally attractive stationary state, an empty dot ○ represents a repulsive 
stationary state, while a saddle point is indicated by drawing its insets and outsets (stable and 
unstable manifolds, respectively). Only some representative trajectories are sketched. For 
simplicity, in this classification, we omit consideration of non robust dynamic regimes, that is, 
the regimes observed only if an equality condition on parameters’ values holds. The dynamic 
regimes that may be observed in the simplex S are the following: 
Case 1: 𝛾 < 𝜀 (and therefore, by assumption (2),  𝛽 > −𝛿). We have two sub-cases: 
1.a) If 𝛽 > 𝜂, then all the stationary states 𝑁, 𝐻, and 𝑃 are locally attractive. No other 
attractive stationary state exists. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the corresponding 
dynamic regimes. They correspond, respectively, to phase portraits number 7 and 35 
in Bomze’s classification (from now on, we shall indicate the phase portrait number # 
of Bomze’s classification with the symbol PP#). 
The regime in Figure 2a is observed if the condition 𝜀 − 𝛾 𝜂 − 𝛽 + 𝛽 + 𝛿 𝜂 −𝛾 < 0, that is: 𝜂 < !"!!"!!!!!!!      (4) 
holds. The regime in Figure 2b is observed if the opposite of condition (4) holds. 
1.b) If 𝛽 < 𝜂, then the stationary states 𝑃 and 𝑁 are locally attractive, while 𝐻 is a 
saddle point. Figure 2c (respectively, 2d) illustrates the dynamic regime occurring if 
condition (4) (respectively, the opposite of (4)) holds. Figures 2c and 2d correspond, 
respectively, to PP9 and PP37. 
 Case 2:  𝛾 > 𝜀 (and therefore, by assumption (2), 𝛽 < −𝛿). In this case,  𝛽 < 0 holds 
 and, therefore, 𝛽 < 𝜂. According to these conditions on parameters, the stationary 
 state 𝑁 is locally attractive,  𝐻 is repulsive and 𝑃 is a saddle point. Furthermore, there 
 exists another locally attractive stationary state: 
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𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0 ,  𝑥!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!   (5) 
if condition (4) holds. The stationary state (5) lies in the edge of the simplex where 
only strategies H and P are played (Figure 2f, which corresponds to PP11). If the 
opposite of condition (4) holds, then  𝑁 is the unique attractive stationary state and the 
dynamic regime is that illustrated in Figure 2g (corresponding to PP36). 
Notice that, in Case 2 (𝛾 > 𝜀 and 𝛽 < −𝛿),  𝜀 − 𝛾 + 𝛽 + 𝛿 < 0 holds and therefore the right 
side of (4) is positive if: 𝛽𝜀 + 𝛾𝛿 < 0      (6) 
To ease interpretation, condition (6) can be also expressed as  𝛾/𝛽 > −𝜀/𝛿. This inequality 
compares the ratio of marginal return when meeting a polite or a hater for haters versus 
polites (abusing terminology, as a sort of marginal rate of substitution of haters vs. polites). If 
(6) holds, at the margin the rate at which haters are willing to forgo meeting one hater for 
meeting a polite is greater than the rate for polites. 
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Figure 2: The taxonomy of dynamic regimes. In these figures, a full dot  represents a locally attractive 
stationary state, an empty dot ○ represents a repulsive stationary state, while a saddle point is indicated by 
drawing its insets and outsets. Only some representative trajectories are sketched. 
•
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Welfare 
Individuals’ payoffs in the pure population stationary states  𝑁,𝐻 and 𝑃  are given respectively 
by  Π! = 𝜂, Π! 1,0 = 𝛽 and  Π! 0,1 = 𝜀; furthermore 𝐻 and 𝑃 are attractive if, 
respectively, 𝛽 > 𝜂 and 𝜀 > 𝛾, 𝜂 hold. Consequently, individuals’ welfare in 𝐻 and 𝑃 is 
higher than in 𝑁, when 𝐻 and 𝑃 are attractive. However, the stability conditions concerning 𝐻 
and 𝑃 do not allow us to order them in terms of welfare. 
In addition, in the stationary state   𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0 , where only the strategies H 
and P are played (see (5)), individuals’ payoff is given by: Π! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ = Π! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ = !"!!"!!!!!!!    (7) 
It is easy to check that: 𝜀 = Π! 0,1 > 𝛱! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ = Π! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ > Π! 1,0 = 𝛽 
holds: individuals’ welfare in   𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0  is lower than in the stationary state  𝑃 and higher 
than in the stationary state  𝐻. Notice that condition (4) holds if and only if (see (7)): Π! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ = Π! 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗ > Π! = 𝜂 
This implies that when the stationary state   𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0   is attractive (this happens in Case 2, 
when condition (4) is satisfied), then individuals’ welfare in   𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0  is higher than in 
the social poverty trap  𝑁. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have built an evolutionary game model to study social interaction in a society 
where social environment can become hostile due to the increase in the share of the 
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population adopting the self-protective N strategy (entailing the choice of social isolation) and 
the impolite H strategy (entailing the adoption of an uncivil behavior in online interactions). 
Our analysis showed that the three pure population stationary states  𝑁, 𝐻, and 𝑃, where all 
individuals adopt the same strategy (respectively N, H, and P), can be simultaneously 
attractive only if 𝛽 > −𝛿 and 𝛾 < 𝜀 hold. In such a context, no attractive stationary state in 
which two or three strategies are played exist. The coexistence between strategies can only be 
observed when   𝛽 < −𝛿 and   𝛾 > 𝜀. In such a context, an attractive stationary state    𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! = 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0 , where only the strategies H and P are played, can exist. The 
first condition,   𝛽 < −𝛿, requires that a H player is more negatively affected by interacting 
with other H players than what would happen to a P player, suggesting that (i) haters do not 
get along with each other, possibly because they get no satisfaction in the absence of proper 
“victims” and/or are forced to take a taste of their own medicine, whereas (ii) polite people 
are only mildly annoyed by interacting with haters. On the other hand, the second condition, 𝛾 > 𝜀, implies that interacting with P players is more satisfactory for a H player than for a P 
player. Our results suggest that politeness can survive in a world with a fair share of haters 
only if the payoffs of polite people are not heavily affected by haters. Thus it would seem that 
Internet users engaged with haters need to heed the same advice Virgil gave Dante upon 
entering Hell: “Let us not speak of them, but do thou look and pass on”. 
Whatever the parameter configuration is, the stationary state  𝑁 is always locally attractive, 
while those entailing positive levels of participation (that is, the stationary states 𝐻, 𝑃,  and 𝑥!∗, 1− 𝑥!∗, 0 ) can be attractive or not, according to the configuration of parameters. When 
this happens, they always give higher payoffs than the social poverty trap 𝑁. 
The destination of dynamics strictly depends on the initial distribution of the strategies in the 
population. This path dependence suggests that societies that are similar along a number of 
fundamental features can converge to different equilibria depending on their initial 
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distribution of strategies 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥! 0 , 𝑥!(0) . Policies aimed at modifying individual 
payoffs might not be sufficient to prevent social poverty traps. From an institutional 
perspective, what could policy makers do to help people out of complete isolation and restore 
social interactions? Should governments intervene, or are there market forces that could be 
leveraged to do so? [9] extensively argue for the need for complementary actions between 
governments and civil society. However, this model is pessimistic about the role of civil 
society; when a social trap forms, the whole population converges to the pure strategy 
equilibrium , without any convenient individual deviation. The dissemination of 
information on the existence of incivility online and the reasons why it can be a serious 
problem for society should be of primary concern for policy makers, SNS managers and users 
alike. Therefore the government should probably enforce policies to prevent defensive self-
isolating behaviors (e.g., school education on SNS and how to react to incivility) or to re-
establish social connections (e.g., free public events, public goods with a social component). 
Future research should shed light on these issues. 
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